类型：历史主题： 命令的部队、军事历史，历史将军、案例研究 问题： 29/10/2012 编辑： 出版者： 企鹅新闻HC， 格式： 精装书 网页： 576 语言： 在 尺寸： 9时45分至x6.54x1.73在 ISBN-10： 9781594204043 ASIN: 1594204047
"From the #1 bestselling author of "Fiasco "and "The Gamble", an epic history of the decline of American military leadership from World War II to Iraq" History has been kind to the American generals of World War II—Marshall, Eisenhower, Patton, and Bradley—and less kind to the generals of the wars that followed. In "The Generals", Thomas E. Ricks sets out to explain why that is. In part it is the story of a widening gulf between performance and accountability. During the Second World War, scores of American generals were relieved of command simply for not being good enough. Today, as one American colonel said bitterly during the Iraq War, “As matters stand now, a private who loses a rifle suffers far greater consequences than a general who loses a war.” In "The Generals "we meet great leaders and suspect ones, generals who rose to the occasion and those who failed themselves and their soldiers. Marshall and Eisenhower cast long shadows over this story, as does the less familiar Marine General O. P. Smith, whose fighting retreat from the Chinese onslaught into Korea in the winter of 1950 snatched a kind of victory from the jaws of annihilation. But Korea also showed the first signs of an army leadership culture that neither punished mediocrity nor particularly rewarded daring. In the Vietnam War, the problem grew worse until, finally, American military leadership bottomed out. The My Lai massacre, Ricks shows us, is the emblematic event of this dark chapter of our history. In the wake of Vietnam a battle for the soul of the U.S. Army was waged with impressive success. It became a transformed institution, reinvigorated from the bottom up. But if the body was highly toned, its head still suffered from familiar problems, resulting in tactically savvy but strategically obtuse leadership that would win battles but end wars badly from the first Iraq War of 1990 through to the present. Ricks has made a close study of America’s military leaders for three decades, and in his hands this story resounds with larger meaning: about the transmission of values, about strategic thinking, and about the difference between an organization that learns and one that fails.
当乔治*马歇尔率领的美国军队在第二次世界大战的将军们经常被解雇。 他们没有多少直以来，写里克斯，这一现象他连接的战略不能令人满意的结论后续战争在韩国、越南、伊拉克和阿富汗。 里克斯是一个军事事务的记者，他的批评伊拉克入侵(惨败，2006年)的回声在这次调查的军队最高层由于第二次世界大战。 他诊断的高层'的问题，因为正好在组织的战斗行动，但是可怕的，在转换战术上的胜利成为战争赢得的成功。 他指出，几个原因的情况。 一个已经缓慢的将军的培训组件的战斗，以适应叛乱战争。 另一个已经里克斯认为，靠边站的不墨守成规的人员、异常值在个人生活习惯或在他们的非正统的位置在军队内部的辩论有关的战略理论。 个别情况下，例如马克斯韦尔*泰勒和威廉*威斯特摩兰，斯托克他负面的评估，军队的领导，其他统一促请作为一种补救措施的复兴的马歇尔的方法促进和解雇将军。 里克斯'的突出地位，加上发行的促进应该平等高档标题。 –吉尔贝*泰勒